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THE IMPACT OF URBAN RENEWAL
ON LAND VALUES: NO COMPENSATION
FOR NON-ACQUIRED LAND
A declaration of blight and the subsequent announcement of urban
renewal plans usually has a disastrous effect on land values. Owners
of property acquired under an urban renewal plan are protected from
loss by statutory provisions and judicial resolution of how the prop-
erty is to be valued for compensation purposes.1 In Sayre v. City of
Cleveland2 the Sixth Circuit considered the loss of value to neighbor-
ing property not slated for acquisition under an urban renewal plan.
Plaintiff was a trustee in bankruptcy for a company that owned sev-
enty-three inner-city parcels of land.3 These properties were located
within the University-Euclid General Neighborhood Renewal Plan
(GNRP), a preliminary plan generally indicating areas contemplated
1. Under Title III (Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy) of the Uniform
Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970, federal
agencies must ignore increases or decreases in the value of land caused by public
improvement or threat thereof when the agency values the land. Uniform Reloca-
tion Assistance and Real Property Acquisitions Policies Act of 1970 § 301(3), 42
U.S.C. § 4651(3) (1970). This policy must also be followed by state agencies
receiving federal funds "to the greatest extent practicable under state law." Id. §
305, 42 U.S.C. § 4655 (1970). Title III does not, however, create any right in
the owner of the sought after property. Id. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4602 (1970).
Additional assistance covering relocation and moving expenses may also be provided
under Title II (Uniform Relocation Assistance) of this Act. Id. §§ 201-18, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4621-38 (1970). Courts can ignore the effects of project-induced blight
by holding that the actual taking occurred when the condemnation proceedings
were instituted. Valuation is then made as of the date of the taking. See cases
cited note 31 inIra. The court may also separate the date of valuation from what
it considers to be the date of the taking. See note 42 and accompanying text
infra. Protection may not always be provided. See, e.g., St. Louis Housing Au-
thority v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Mo. 1964).
For an analysis of the British approach to planning blight see D. HAGMAN,
PLANNING (CONDEMNATION) BLIGHT, PARTICIPATION AND JUST COMPENSATION:
ANGLo-AMERICAN COMPARISONS (1972).
2. 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
3. The original suit listed 194 properties. Summary judgment was granted by
the district court to the defendant for 107 of the parcels. Defendant appealed
from the denial of a motion for summary judgment as to 87 properties. Fourteen
of the 87 had since been acquired by the defendant leaving 73 involved in this
appeal. Id. at 66-67.
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for clearance and redevolpment.4 Most were also included in the Uni-
versity-Euclid Urban Renewal Plan (Project One).s Project One, the
first phase of the GNRtP, indicated the precise parcels which the city
intended to acquire.6 None of the properties owned by plaintiff's bank-
rupt were designated for acquisition, but some of the properties were
subsequently acquired. All of the properties, however, sustained a sub-
stantial loss in value due to their inclusion within the project's
boundaries.
Plaintiff alleged an unconstitutional taking by the City of Cleve-
land without compensation in violation of the due process clause of
the fifth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.7 Plaintiff argued that GNRP, Project One, with the at-
tendant publicity, and decline in public services normally supplied to
the area led to a marked loss of tenants and increased vandalism and
crime that destroyed the use and value of property in the area.8 He
argued further that this constituted a de facto taking which violated
the fifth and fourteenth amendments despite the absence of physical
invasion or condemnation by the city.9 The Sixth Circuit held, how-
ever, that "there is no de facto taking of properties which have de-
creased in value because of an urban renewal project unless there is a
physical invasion, damage or injury, or a restraint of some type, or
action by the City to appropriate such properties."'1 Thus, the court
adopted what may be termed the "strict" rule of de facto taking."'
4. The plan was made with federal assistance pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1452
(1970). 493 F.2d at 67.
5. Project One was also a federally funded program under 42 U.S.C. § 1460(b)
(1970). 493 F.2d at 67-68.
6. Project One is the only phase of the GNRP that has begun. U.S. D.P'T OF
HOUSING AND URBAN Dav., PRoJEcT REHAB MONITORING REPORT OVERVIEW
15-16 (1971).
7. U.S. CoNsT. amends. 5, 14, § 1. Plaintiff originally alleged negligence, but
because of the defendant's immunity he was forced to amend. The allegation of a
de facto taking which replaced it created federal jurisdiction which was lacking
in the first complaint. See Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 282 F. Supp. 175, 181
(N.D. Ohio 1967); Brief for the Appellant at 21-22, Sayre v. City of Cleveland,
493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 837 (1974).
8. Brief of Appellee at 6-7, Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.
1974).
9. Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 282 F. Supp. 175, 183 (N.D. Ohio 1967); see
Foster v. Herley, 330 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1964).
10. 493 F.2d at 70.
11. E.g., City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 254-55, 269
N.E.2d 895, 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345, 356-57 (1971).
[Vol. 10:385
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol10/iss1/17
IMPACT OF URBAN RENEWAL ON LAND VALUES
It is well established, however, that a taking requiring compensation
may occur without the accompaniment of formal condemnation pro-
ceedings,'; although mere consequential damages are not compen-
sable? 3 Application of either rule becomes difficult when the facts
in an individual case are somewhere between these two generally
accepted rules of law. Under the strict rule the aggrieved owner is
to be compensated only when a governmental project results in an
affirmative occupancy which invades the land directly.14 Exceptions
and broad interpretations of the strict rule abound. Approximately
half the states are not bound to the narrow federal rule, since their
state constitutional eminent domain provisions allow compensation
for loss due to damage as well as actual taking of property. 15 By
12. See, e.g., United States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950)
(dam permanently raising water table destroying use of farm constitutes a com-
pensable taking); Eyherabide v. United States, 345 F.2d 565 (Ct. Cl. 1965) (mis-
taken use of property as part of gunnery range compensable as a de facto taking).
See generally Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of
Public Responsibility, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 3; Michelman, Property, Utility and
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80
HAsv. L. REv. 1165, 1184-90 (1967) ; Sackman, Condemnation Blight-A Problem
in Compensability and Value, in 1973 INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING & EAMI-
NENT DOtAIN PROCEEDINGS 157.
13. Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368 (1924) (governmental use of
adjacent land diminishing value not compensable); Gibson v. United States, 166
U.S. 269 (1897) (loss of access from riparian land to navigable stream due to
governmental activity on the stream not compensable); Woodland Mkt. Realty
Co. v. City of Cleveland, 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970) (land adjacent to property
appropriated for urban renewal is not taken even though a substantial decrease in
the market value occurred). The court in Sayre found Woodland Market to be
dispositive. 493 F.2d at 70. States, however, may compensate for consequential
damages by statute. 11 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 32.93
(Supp. 1974).
14. This constitutes a de facto taking. Compensation may be had through in-
verse condemnation proceedings. See note 12 supra. Frequent examples of this
strict rule are flooding and airplane overflight cases. The United States Supreme
Court has required compensation for the owner of land that was permanently
flooded by the backwaters of a dam. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166(1871) ; accord, United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). The invasion must
be direct. See note 13 supra. Compensation has also been required for land that
lost its value due to direct aircraft overflights. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.
256 (1946); accord, Griggs v. Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962). For a discussion of
the requirement that direct overflights are necessary see Michelman, supra note 12,
at 1169-70. But cf. Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963) (damage due to plane flights not directly over-
head are not compensable).
15. See, e.g., Conger v. Pierce County, 116 Wash. 27, 198 P. 377 (1921); Mo.
CONST. art. I, § 26; Mandelker, supra note 12, at 18-19.
1975]
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viewing the interference with legal property rights as an equivalent
of a physical taking, recovery may be allowed absent affirmative
occupancy or a resulting public use 6 if there is an interference with
use.17 An expanded approach to compensation may be justified by
drawing an analogy to the anticipated results in a comparable private
action. If the landowner could have maintained an action for tort-
nuisance, trespass or negligence-against a private citizen, the courts
under this approach will apply the standards of these actions to the
parties in an inverse condemnation action. 8 Some courts have also
examined private property rights such as riparian rights and the
right to lateral support in a similar manner.1 9
Reliance on tort or property theories is useful only for analogy
and not as a basis for finding consequential damages compensable. 20
Damage due to governmental activities not directly invading the
property is not a taking even though the use of the property may
be impaired.2' In Woodland Market Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland22
the Sixth Circuit considered whether property immediately adjacent
to appropriated property is actually taken because of a substantial
drop in value occasioned by an urban renewal project. 23 The court
16. For a discussion of the public use requirement see 2A P. NicnoLs, THn
LA-W OP EMINENT DOmAIN § 7.1 (3d ed. 1974).
17. See notes 30-31 and accompanying text infra.
18. Sovereign immunity may be applicable in these actions. Immunity does not
apply to a fifth amendment taking since the amendment contains a self-executing
and implied waiver. See, e.g., United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946);
Bacich v. Board of Control, 23 Cal. 2d 343, 144 P.2d 818 (1943); Hickman v.
Kansas City, 120 Mo. 110, 25 S.W. 225 (1894); Swift & Co. v. City of Newport
News, 105 Va. 108, 52 S.E. 821 (1906).
19. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); Siefert v. City of Brooklyn,
101 N.Y. 136, 4 N.E. 321 (1886); Bunyan v. Palisades Interstate Park, 167 App.
Div. 457, 153 N.Y.S. 622 (1915). See 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13, § 32.93;
Foster, Tort Liability Under Damage Clauses, 5 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1952); Man-
delker, supra note 12, at 9-12.
20. See cases cited note 13 supra.
21. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 510 (1945)
("damage alone gives courts no power to require compensation where there is not
an actual taking of property"); Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S.
546, 554 (1914) (damage from legalized nuisance not compensable without inva-
sion); Transportation Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1878) (damage caused by
adjacent municipal construction project).
22. 426 F.2d 955 (6th Cir. 1970).
23. Id. at 957.
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rejected the claim of a compensable taking even though the action
might normally have represented a tort.2 4 The consequential damage
rule requires at least a partial taking or an acceptable alternative
basis for recovery25 before compensation is available. Since a claim
of sovereign immunity may preclude the alternate basis, an owner
could suffer serious losses that would not be compensable absent a
finding that the property was taken.- Sayre comes within this cate-
gory of cases. Because the plaintiff did not allege a direct physical
invasion of the property,2 7 a resulting public use or benefit, or an
infringement upon traditional property rights,-5 no compensable de
facto taking existed under traditional theories2
The court arguably could have found a taking in Sayre on two
grounds. First, a taking may be said to have occurred as a result of
negative restraints.S0 Negative restraint cases are a logical extension
of the affirmative occupancy requirement of traditional eminent
domain theory. The government is viewed as affirmatively "occupy-
ing" the owner's property rights. The most frequent application
24. Id. at 958.
25. An alternate basis for recovery would exist where a state had waived its
sovereign immunity.
26. Sayre alone involved a claim for $10 million. Brief for Appellant at 3,
Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974).
27. See Michelman, supra note 12, at 1184-90. Plaintiff does not allege direct
enough damage for even liberal state provisions. 11 E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 13,
§ 32.38; 4A P. NicnoLs, supra note 16, at 14.1.
28. A property owner does not have a traditional property right in the value of
his property. While discussing the substantial loss in value precipitated by an urban
renewal project, the court in Woodland Market declared "[t]he action of the
City has resulted in no diminution of the plaintiff's rights in its property. Its
leasehold estate has remained intact. What has altered is the character of the
neighborhood, not the character of the plaintiff's leasehold interest." 426 F.2d
at 958.
29. See note 12 supra.
30. A negative restraint occurs when the government limits the owner's use
through legal restraints rather than condemning or invading the land. "The term
'taking' should not be limited in an unreasonable or narrow sense. It should not
be limited to the absolute conversion of property, and apply to land only; but it
should include cases where the value is destroyed by the action of the government,
or serious injury is inflicted to the property itself, or exclusion of the owner from
its enjoyment, or from any of the appurtenances thereto." Pearsall v. Board of
Supervisors, 74 Mich. 558, 561, 42 N.W. 77, 77-78 (1889). But cf. United States
v. Certain Property Located in the Borough of Manhattan, 374 F.2d 138 (2d Cir.
1967) (taking and valuation held to occur at the end of the proceeding). A
negative restraint, therefore, may constitute only a valid exercise of the sovereign's
police power as in zoning or it may constitute a taking. See note 31 infra.
1975
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occurs when the right to sell or repair the property is limited by
the government because the property is slated for eventual acquisi-
tion.81 If such limitations were not recognized as a taking, the
government could limit rights that directly affect value, and then
profit from its own actions in later condemnation proceedings.32
These negative restraint cases are designed to limit the government's
ability to abuse its power of eminent domain to the detriment of
the land owner.
The courts, however, have been unwilling to hold that either
planning or legislation alone is a sufficient restraint to constitute a
compensable taking.33 They continue to require a direct restraint on
recognized property rights.34 In Sayre plaintiff lacked the two elements
necessary to claim that a de facto taking had occurred. First, the
city had not demonstrated any intent to acquire, 5 and secondly, there
31. E.g., Foster v. City of Detroit, 254 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aft'd,
405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968). Most cases involve restraints during the pendency
of a condemnation action. In Foster the process was started twice and lasted over
ten years. See also Eleopoulos v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 351 F. Supp. 63
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Madison Realty Co. v. City of Detroit, 315 F. Supp. 367
(E.D. Mich. 1970); Haczela v. City of Bridgeport, 299 F. Supp. 709 (D. Conn.
1969).
32. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973), is ex-
emplary of the types of affirmative value-depressing acts that cities can engage in
and might be considered a new diminution of value case, since there were few
legal restraints involved. See notes 39-44 and accompanying text inlra. See also
9 URBAN L. ANN. 317 (1975).
33. E.g., Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271, 286 (1939); United States
v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 258 (1939); Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 596-
98 (1897); 23 Tracts of Land v. United States, 177 F.2d 967 (6th Cir. 1949);
Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109
Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Cayon v. City of Chicopee, 360 Mass. 606, 277 N.E.2d
116 (1971); Bakken v. State, 142 Mont. 166, 382 P.2d 550 (1963); Wilson v.
City of Long Branch, 27 N.J. 360, 142 A.2d 837, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 873
(1958); Empire Constr., Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 512 P.2d 119 (Okla.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1094 (1973).
34. See cases cited note 13 supra.
35. The intent requirement prevents a claim alleging abuse of eminent domain
powers from succeeding solely on a pattern of conduct. Intent was exhibited as to
fourteen of the parcels through a notice sent to the tenants. Thirteen of these
parcels were acquired and are not part of this appeal. The conduct which plaintiff
alleged affected the other parcels would, if the requisite intent existed, be adequate
to constitute a de facto taking. Plaintiff tried to utilize the "natural consequence"
approach employed by some courts in negative restraint cases to determine whether
[Vol. 10:385
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was no demonstrable direct restraint.r6 While courts may grant
relief absent one element if the other is particularly prevalent,37 it is
not consistent with this approach to grant relief when there is no
intent to acquire and the restraints are not significant.3 8
Secondly, the Sayre court could have found a taking by relying on
the diminution of value theory. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon-9
the United States Supreme Court held that a Pennsylvania law ex-
ceeded state police powers, constituting a taking without compensa-
tion. In so holding it found that diminution of value was one factor
to be used in determining the limits of police powers.40 This approach
has found new favor recently, not as a theory of taking, but as one
of valuation.41 Courts, though unwilling to hold that a taking occurs
the city "intended" to take the property. Instead of using it to measure govern-
mental intention after commencement of condemnation proceedings, he relied upon
it as a threshold determiner of blight, arguing that because the defendant knew
that blight would be the natural consequence of the urban renewal plan, the city
must therefore have intended to take the plaintiff's property. Sayre v. United
States, 282 F. Supp. 175, 185 (N.D. Ohio 1967); see Biggs Rental Co. v. United
States, 353 F.2d 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); Brief for
Appellant at 20-21, Brief for Appellee at 19-20, Sayre v. City of Cleveland, 493
F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974).
36. See notes 30, 35 supra. Even pendency of condemnation may not be enough
in some instances. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Barnes, 375 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.
1964); Smith v. Erie Rd. Co., 134 Ohio St. 135, 16 N.E.2d 310 (1938).
37. Drakes Bay Land Co. v. United States, 424 F.2d 574 (Ct. Cl. 1970) ; Amen
v. City of Dearborn, 363 F. Supp. 1267 (E.D. Mich. 1973). In both instances the
government, through widespread publicity of imminent condemnation, precluded
sale or development of the property. The restraints were more practical than legal.
Cf. cases cited note 33 supra in which the planning or legislation may have had
the same practical effect but the intent was insufficient to induce court relief.
38. "fDjamages which are the incidental result of lawful governmental action,
without any direct invasion of private property . . . do not constitute a taking
under the Fifth Amendment." Nunnally v. United States, 239 F.2d 521, 524 (4th
Cir. 1956). For a description of plaintiff's claim see note 46 infra.
39. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
40. Id. at 413. This approach has been most widely used in zoning cases. See,
e.g., Dooley v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 151 Conn. 304, 197 A.2d 770
(1964). Diminution of value has not found particular favor with scholars. See
Michelman, supra note 12, at 1190-92; Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74
YALF- L.J. 36, 50-60 (1964). Even the Supreme Court has not become enamored
with the approach of Pennsylvania Coal. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead,
369 U.S. 590 (1962); Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S. 271 (1939).
41. United States v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624 (1961); Biggs
Rental Co. v. United States, 353 F.2d 1013 (Ct. Cl. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
927 (1966); In re Urban Renewal, Elmwood Park Project, 376 Mich. 311, 136
19761
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immediately when legal restraints are placed on the property, may
still protect the property owner by setting the date of valuation at
the beginning of condemnation proceedings rather than the end.42
The city is prevented from profiting from its own direct, intentional,
value depressing acts. The traditional rules still apply in detenining
the acts necessary to constitute a taking.43 This diminution of value
approach is consistent with the view of the Supreme Court, and those
of most state courts, when, conversely, the property value has actually
been enhanced in the interim due to the government's own activities. 4
Both the new diminution of value and the value-enhancement
approaches to valuation presume a taking and are not applicable to
the facts of Sayre. This case would require use of the diminution of
value theory in conjunction with inroads that have been created by
the courts under the negative restraint approach.45 Plaintiff asked
the court to combine and apply what were already two extensions of
the traditional theories of taking. 4 0 In valuation cases, however, the
N.W.2d 896 (1965); City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269
N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971); City of Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio
App. 525, 190 N.B.2d 52 (1963); SELECT Suacoasar. ON REAL PROPERTY ACQUI-
SITION OF THE HOUSE COMA. ON PUBLIC WORKS, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., STUDY Ol
COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FOR PERSONS AFFECTED BY REAL PROPERTY
ACQUISITION IN FEDERAL AND FEDERALLY ASSISTED PROORAxs; 64-67 (Comm.
Print No. 31, 1964); 72 COLUM. L. Rtxv. 772 (1972).
42. One significant difference in this approach is that it minimizes interest pay-
ments that begin accruing as soon as the property is taken. Under the new diminu-
tion of value approach, the interest does not start until the title passes, which may
occur years after the date of valuation. Under the negative restraints approach
interest starts with the taking, and since this approach is an expansion of de facto
taking cases, title need not pass to constitute a taking. Under the negative re-
straints approach the date of the taking is frequently set at either the initiation
of condemnation proceedings or the date the owner is notified of the proposed
action. The difference in interest due may be substantial. In City of Buffalo v.
J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d 241, 254, 269 N.E.2d 895, 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345,
357 (1971), the difference amounted to $459,603.86.
43. See id. at 254-55, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356-57.
44. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States v. Miller, 317
U.S. 369 (1943); Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282 (1893); 4 P.
NICHOLS, supra note 16, § 12.3151.
45. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
46. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text supra. Plaintiff sought to use the
diminution of value as a direct restraint. At the same time he wished to avoid the
issues of directness and intent inherent in either the negative restraint approach or
the new diminution of value theory. At no time did the City take any direct action
against the plaintiff's properties, either by designating that the properties were to
be acquired or by actually starting eminent domain proceedings. 493 F.2d at 67.
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courts have required direct, intentional, value-depressing acts 7 Even
Pennsylvania Coal involved a direct restraint.48 The de facto taking
cases in which direct restraints or invasions seem unimportant are
distinguishable, since they rely on the intent of the governmental
unit involved.49
There are strong policy considerations, however, that militate
against encompassing plaintiff's claim within either liberal approach.
Since land values vary over time, plaintiff's loss may be either tem-
porary or the result of other causes. If the project is successful,
plaintiff will eventually profit from it because the governmental
interference in the market is temporary. Project enhancement 0 and
diminution of value approaches recognize the temporary character
of the interference by considering the market value in spite of the
interference.5' The important distinctions between the de facto taking
cases and Sayre is that plaintiff in Sayre had not lost his land. Thus,
the losses claimed in Sayre may remain only "paper" losses. If plaintiff
could recover damages and keep the land, he would profit unjustly
when the value increased. If the government were to acquire title,
it would have to dispose of land that it did not want in an already
depressed market. This would increase both the cost of urban renewal
and the value diminution caused by the program on those parcels
still held by private owners. The only owners likely to benefit are
those who can afford the attorney necessary to bring the requisite
inverse condemnation action.
If plaintiff in Sayre had been allowed to recover, urban planning
would be constrained to an intolerable degree. Plaintiff contended
that mere inclusion first within a general urban renewal plan and
then a specific renewal plan was sufficient to constitute a de facto
taking. The potential liability of cities with urban renewal programs
47. See notes 33-38 and accompanying text supra.
48. In Pennsylvania Coal the mining company owned coal-bearing land and
proceeded to sell the surface rights. Pennsylvania law prohibited mining under
homes if that mining would cause subsidence. This effectively banned the exploi-
tation of mineral rights in areas where the coal company did not own the surface
rights. 260 U.S. at 413.
49. See note 37 supra. In both Drakes Bay and Amen the government had de-
cided that it would eventually acquire the land in question.
50. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
51. See note 42 supra.
1975]
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would be astounding.5 2 It may be argued that such court-led economic
destruction of urban renewal would in fact be a blessing. The pro-
gram on the whole has not been an overwhelming success. 8 Instead
of heralding the death of urban renewal, a decision for plaintiff
might only have shifted the emphasis to complete acquisition pro-
grams and intensified the present failings, especially those concerning
relocation and destruction of low-income housing units. Such a de-
cision would possibly limit options under an urban renewal plan,
imposing a restraint on flexibility that would be undesirable given
the size and complexity of current urban decay.
Arguably, the impact of allowing compensation for planning blight
would not be limited to urban renewal. Allowing plaintiff to recover
would recognize market value as a property right." Almost any
governmental activity could conceivably affect land valuation. Com-
pensation in these instances would necessarily be required if valuation
were recognized as a property right. The use of planning as a general,
flexible and long-range decisionmaking tool would not be feasible.?
While the problem that Sayre raises is serious, the judicial adaptations
necessary to provide the plaintiff relief would completely disrupt
governmental planning processes. Only if the plaintiff's loss was
permanent and due to direct governmental action would the court
feel that such a result is justified.
Kim C. Brown
52. See note 26 supra.
53. Urban renewal induced demolition has contributed to shortages of low-
cost housing units, leading to intensification of slum conditions and residential
segregation patterns. See generally NAT'L ADVISORY Coims. ON URBAN PROBLEMTS,
BUILDING THE AmERICAN CITY 152-70 (1968). Approximately 400,000 dwelling
units were destroyed by urban renewal by 1967 while only 10,760 units of public
housing had been built on urban renewal land. Id. at 160, 163. For a discussion
of relocation in urban renewal programs see E. CAHN, T. EiCHENBERG & R. Ross-
BERG, THE LEGAL LAWBREAKERS: A STUDY IN OFFICIAL LAWLESSNESS RE-
GARDING FEDERAL RELOCATION REQUIREMENTS (1970); Gans, The Failure of
Urban Renewal, COMMENTARY 537-57 (1965); Hartman, Relocation: Illusory
Promises and No Relief, 57 VA. L. REv. 745 (1971).
54. This would constitute a rejection of the very foundations of the consequential
damage rule. See Sax, supra note 40, at 50. See also notes 13, 28 supra.
55. Brief for Cities of Cincinnati and Dayton as Amici Curiae at 2-4, Sayre v.
City of Cleveland, 493 F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1974). See Selby Realty Co. v. City of
San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 120-21, 514 P.2d 111, 117-18, 109 Cal. Rptr.
799, 805-06 (1973). A favorable decision for the plaintiff in Sayre would have to
rest on the effect of the plan and not on the intent of the plan. Such a result is
broad enough to include almost any form of planning and it would be difficult to
distinguish any plan from Sayre on the basis of type or degree of specificity.
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